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In the paper we examine the economic voting theory for the Romanian local elections 
in June, 2008. Econometrically, we demonstrate that in the regional structures the main 
economic variables (dynamics of the gross domestic product per capita, rate of 
unemployment, dynamics of the average net nominal monthly earnings, etc.) do not 
significantly influence the voting behaviour, so that a model based on the responsibility 
hypothesis is not adequate for explaining the creation of voting preferences in the 
Romanian regional structures in the June 2008 elections. We also demonstrate that for 
the June 2008 local elections the hypothesis of partisan voting cannot be 
econometrically supported. As a consequence, we have conceived a political impact 
model. Therefore, we have tested the hypothesis of faithful voters between two 
consecutive electoral moments, the engine role played by the well-known leaders, and 
the impact of the ethnic behaviour on the electoral space of the political party. 
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1. Theoretical background 
Connections between economy and politics appear in economic literature with two 
aspects: 
  (1) Political business cycles; 
  (2) Theory of economic voting. 
The political business cycle can be seen as a business cycle that results (a) from the 
manipulation of policy tools (fiscal policy, monetary policy) by incumbent politicians with 
the hope to stimulate the economy just prior to an election and, thereby, to improve 
greatly their own and their party's re-election chances or (b) from the competition 
amongst political parties with different ideologies. On that account, the theory of 
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political business cycle investigates the relationship between political cycles and 
economic cycles, namely how the timing of elections, the ideological orientation of 
governments and the nature of the competition among the political parties influence 
unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and the use of various monetary and fiscal 
policy instruments. 
The two main types of political business cycles are: 
•  election cycles, generated by governments manipulating the economy to 
maximize re-election chances (opportunistic cycles models), and 
•  partisan cycles, generated by the change of governments pursuing different 
goals (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997). 
Also, in literature, models based on the syntheses between opportunistic and partisan 
political behaviour have been built (Fray and Schneider, 1978). Further on, to set out 
from the opportunistic-ideological spectrum of political motivation, the models of the 
political business cycles can be classified according to the expectations that individuals 
are assumed to have. 
In the paper we will stress the other aspect of the relation between politics and 
economics, meaning that we examine the effect of economic conditions on the election 
results (theory of economic voting). Concerning the standard theory of economic 
voting, Owen and Tucker (2007) asserted: "In its most straightforward form, the 
predominant model of economic voting employed in studies of established 
democracies expects that voters will tend to punish the incumbent in bad economic 
times and reward the incumbent when the economy is doing well"
1, or as Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier (2000, p. 183) affirmed: "The citizen votes for the government if the 
economy is doing all right; otherwise, the vote is against"
2. That is because "after all, 
nothing is more fundamental to popular control than the idea that citizens hold 
government officials accountable for their collective actions" (Kuklinski and West 1981, 
p. 437)
3. According to Nannestad and Paldam (1994)
4, this is the so-called 
responsibility hypothesis: the voters hold the current government responsible for the 
state of the economy.   
There is nowadays a rich literature dedicated to this subject. Or, as Anderson stated 
(2007, p. 273)
5, by the end of the twentieth century the flow of scholarly papers on the 
topic had "changed from a trickle to a torrent of over 300 articles and books on 
                                                           
1 Owen A., Tucker J.A., 2007, It’s a Multifaceted Economic Effect, Stupid! Conventional vs. 
Transitional Economic Voting in Poland, 1997-2005, p. 4 (Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, April 12-15, Chicago, IL. 
http://homepages.nyu.edu/~jat7/MPSA_13-3_ Owen_Tucker.pdf). 
2 Lewis-Beck M.S., Stegmaier M., 2000, "Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes", 
Annual Review of Political Science, June, Vol. 3: 183-219. 
3 Kuklinski J.H., West D.M., 1981, Economic expectations and voting behaviour in United States 
House and Senate elections. American Political Science Review. 75:436–47 
4 Nannestad P., Paldam M., 1994, "The VP-function: a survey of the literature on vote and 
popularity functions after 25 years", Public Choice 79:213–45 
5 Anderson C.J., 2007, "The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of 
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economics and elections" (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, p. 183) and covered 
virtually every democracy for which data on economics and elections were available. 
The connection between vote and the condition of the economy is recognized not only 
in academic researches, but also in the analyses of the policymakers. The statement of 
Harold Wilson
6, former British Prime Minister is well known: "All political history shows 
that the standing of a Government and its ability to hold the confidence of the 
electorate at a General Election depend on the success of its economic policy"
7.  
Just after the first free electoral moment (in the early 90’), in the former communist 
countries studies regarding the effect of economic conditions on the election results 
have started to appear. Moreover, a review carried out by Tucker (2002, p. 271)
8 
concerning the study of the economic impact on post-communist elections and voting 
counted over 100 articles in only 16 academic journals between 1990 and 2000. 
Obviously, these studies started to consider also the economic and political features of 
those countries. The outcome was the creation of some models starting from the main 
hypotheses in the standard model. For example, Tucker (2002, 2005, 2006) make the 
following "two assumptions to craft a model that is based on the partisan approach to 
economic voting but is appropriate for the post-communist context"
9: (1) voters have 
low levels of information about political parties, and (2) instead of assuming that voters 
are guided by concerns with specific economic problems, he assumes that they have 
general concerns about the economy; they react to it either being "bad" or "good"
10. 
2. Empirical results for Romania 
To explain the creation of voting behaviour in the local elections held in Romania in 
June 2008, we start in a first approach to Anderson’s idea (2007), which is:  "Given 
citizens’ limited willingness and capacity to process complex information about politics, 
reward and punishment should most easily be detectable with regard to the 
performance of the economy - after all, the economy is perhaps the most perennially 
talked-about issue during election campaigns in democracies". Consequently, we 
examine the effect of economic conditions on municipal election results. 
First, we have tested whether there is an econometric relation between the votes for 
candidates representing the ruling party and the state of economy, the so-called 
responsibility hypothesis. Practically, we have tested the connection between the votes 
for the ruling party (National Liberal Party) in the elections for County Councils of June 
1
st, 2008, and the local economic conditions existing just before the elections. The 
                                                           
6 Harold Wilson (11 March 1916 – 24 May 1995), Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 
1964 to 1970, and again from 1974 to 1976. 
7 Quoted by Watt (1968, p. 15): Watt D., 1968 "Labour’s hard road to recovery", Financial Times, 
March 8:15. 
8 Tucker J.A., 2002, "The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections And Voting: What Have We 
Studied, and How Have We Studied It?", Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 5: 271-304. 
9 Tucker J.A., 2005, "Red, Brown, and Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic from 1990-99", Annual Meeting of the Mid-West Political 
Science Association, Chicago, IL and the University of Michigan’s New Challenges for Political 
Parties and Representation Conference, May 6-7. 
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economic conditions are represented by the unemployment rate recorded in the 42 
counties in May 2008 (U)
11, the dynamics of Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(dGDP)
12 and the evolution of the Average Net Nominal Monthly Earnings – dANME
13. 
The estimated model was: 
  N L P t =  a0 + a1Ut + a2·dGDPt + a3·dANMEt + a4·dumCVt + 
         +  a 5·dumHRt + et 
where: 
NPL  =  vote for National Liberal Party (incumbent party) in the elections 
for County Councils, 1
st June, 2008; 
U   =  rate of unemployment, by counties, in May 2008; 
dGDP  =  dynamics of the gross domestic product per capita, by counties, 
yearly estimations (2007 = 100%); 
 dANME  =  dynamics of the average net nominal monthly earnings, by 
counties, yearly estimations (2007 = 100%); 
t  =  county, t = 1, 2, …, 42; 
dumCV   =  dummy variables used for Covasna county; 
dumHR   =  dummy variables used for Harghita county; 
e =  error  variable. 
We use the dummy variables for Covasna and Harghita counties due to the stable 
fidelity of the voters from those counties for the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania (ethnic vote). 
The expected results are: 
a1 < 0  increase in unemployment rate has a negative effect on voting for 
incumbents, 
a2 > 0  economic development increases the electoral chances for incumbent 
party 
a3 > 0  increase in wages has as effect an increase in votes for incumbents. 
The obtained results for the local elections in Romania (June, 1
st, 2008) are not 
econometrically significant: 
Coefficient  Explanatory variable 
Symbol Value 
t-Statistic 
Constant a0 20.4921  2.518
*) 
U a1 0.6892  0.944
**) 
dGPD a2 -0.0004  -0.572
**) 
dANME a3 -0.0858  -0.153
**) 
dumCV a4 -22.0212  -3.245
*) 
dumHR a5 -18.2289  -2.793
*) 
R
2 = 0.35, Durbin Watson statistic = 1.75. 
*) Significant at 5% level. 
**) Econometrically non-significant. 
                                                           
11 National Institute of Statistics, 2008, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 5: "Number of Registered 
Unemployed, by County, at the End of May 2008", p.126, table 78. 
12 Because we do not have quarterly estimation of regional GDP (at NUTS-3 level), we have 
used the yearly estimations of National Commission for Prognosis, see www.cnp.ro 
13 Yearly estimations of National Commission for Prognosis, see www.cnp.ro  Regional Economic Voting in Romania 
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The estimators a1, a2 and a3 are not significantly different from zero. 
Next, we test other models, based also on the responsibility hypothesis. After the general 
elections in 2004, the resulted government included the DA-Alliance (Justice and Truth 
Alliance – in Romanian "Dreptate şi Adevăr" – formed by the National Liberal Party and 
the Democratic Party), together with the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. 
Although on April 11, 2007 the DA-Alliance was politically dissolved and the Democratic 
Party was excluded from the government, we have tested the hypothesis of a common 
perception (NLP + DP) at the electorate’s level, through a model such as: 
  Former D.A. – Alliancet   = b0 + b1·Ut + b2·dGDPt + b3·dANMEt + 
   +  b4·dumCVt + b5·dumHRt + εt, 
where the variable Former D.A. – Alliance collects the votes for the National Liberal 
Party and the Democrat-Liberal Party. The Democratic-Liberal Party was constituted in 
December, 2007 by the merger between the Democratic Party and the Liberal 
Democratic Party
14. 
Neither this model is econometrically significant (the estimators b1, b2 and b3 are not 
significantly different from zero for a reasonable confidence level): 
Coefficient  Explanatory variable 
Symbol Value 
t-Statistic 
Constant b0 37.9628  3.561
*) 
U b1 0.2941 0.307
**) 
dGPD b2 -0.0009 -1.075
**) 
dANME b3 1.0640 1.448
**) 
dumCV b4 -50.6484  -5.697
*) 
dumHR b5 -41.6028  -4.866
*) 
*) Significant at 5% level 
**) Econometrically non-significant 
R
2 = 0.627, Durbin Watson statistic = 1.705. 
 
We have not included in such an economic-political model the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) because the votes for that alliance are not political 
votes, but based on ethnic criteria (the percentage of DAHR votes in the total votes for 
each county is similar to the percentage of the Hungarian population in that county). 
As a conclusion, a model based on the responsibility hypothesis is not adequate for 
explaining the creation of voting preferences in the regional structures in Romania in 
the June 2008 elections. 
Based on this conclusion, we have tested a partisan model. Only the Social 
Democratic Party of Romania (SDP) can be loosely classified as a centre-left party, 
although the right-left division in Romania is quite blurred
15. Therefore, we test the 
hypothesis that in the poor areas and in those with high unemployment rate the votes 
go to the left-wing party, namely SDP. Thus, we test the model: 
 SDPt = c0 + c1Ut + c2·dGDPt + c3·dANMEt + c4·dumCVt + c5·dumHRt + vt 
                                                           
14 The Liberal Democratic Party was a wing detached from the National Liberal Party in 
December 2006 and officially enlisted on March 1
st, 2007. 
15 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Democratic_Party_(Romania). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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(vt is the error variable). 
We expect that c1 > 0 (the unemployed vote for the left-party), c2 < 0 and c3 < 0 (in poor 
areas the people vote with the left-wing party). 
These are the results: 
Coefficient  Explanatory variable 
Symbol Value 
t-Statistic 
Constant c0 34.7995  3.007
*) 
U c1 1.3283  1.279
**) 
dGPD c2 0.0005  0.583
**) 
dANME c3 -1.0446  -1.309
**) 
dumCV c4 -31.6950  -3.284
*) 
dumHR c5 -25.3350  -2.729
*) 
*) Significant at 5% level. 
**) Econometrically non-significant. 
R
2 = 0.345, Durbin Watson statistic = 2.10. 
 
The estimators for the coefficients c1, c2  şi c3 are not statistically significant (not 
significantly different from zero) on a reasonable level of confidence. This leads to the 
conclusion that the hypothesis of partisan voting cannot be econometrically supported. 
An explanation can be found in Tucker’s suggestion (2005): "Transporting a simple 
partisan based approach to the post-communist world is problematic because of the 
pervasive levels of uncertainty in any new democracy. It is difficult to apply a simple 
left-right classification scheme to parties in transition countries; both because it is hard 
to know where parties stand and because they can often change their positions. 
Moreover, even if analysts could come up with a compelling schema, it would be a 
stretch to assume that those voters would be able to associate parties of a certain 
partisan persuasion with specific policies as closely as voters can in established 
democracies"
16. 
It seems that no evidence (at least through econometric reasons) is found for partisan 
model in Romanian regional elections, or for the responsibility hypothesis based model. 
“The end of economic voting?” asked Christopher J. Anderson in a recent paper
17. 
Actually, the stable relationship between economic performance and voter behaviour 
was challenged by Paldam since 1991
18 (the so-called instability dilemma
19). In 
                                                           
16 Tucker J.A., 2005, "Red, Brown, and Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic from 1990-99", Annual Meeting of the Mid-West Political 
Science Association, Chicago, IL and the University of Michigan’s New Challenges for Political 
Parties and Representation Conference, May 6-7, p.4-5. 
17 Anderson C.J., 2007, "The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of 
Democratic Accountability", Annual Reviews of Political Science. 10:271–96. 
18 "First X presents an impressive study of the Vote or Popularity function for country Z, with a 
nice theory and - most important - very fine econometric fits: a high R
2, very significant t-ratios, 
and, in addition, some new econometric trick like the ζ  ζ - test from the latest issues of 
Esoterica. Everybody is impressed, until a few years later Y demonstrates that, by one little 
change, X’s result collapses" (Paldam M. 1991. How robust is the vote function?, Economics 
and Politics: The Calculus of Support, ed. Norpoth H., Lewis-Beck M.S., Lafay J.D., p. 10. Ann 
Arbor: Univ.Mich. Press).  Regional Economic Voting in Romania 
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Anderson’s statement: "After all, in the imperfect world of social science research, the 
use of different model specifications and different time periods (in time-series research) 
is bound to lead to at least somewhat different estimates of the relationship between, 
say, government popularity and the rate of economic growth"
20. 
Although the economic performance cannot explain the voting behaviour in the 
Romanian regional elections, we accept the hypothesis that votes do not follow a 
random schema and, as a consequence, we have conceived a political impact model. 
We have tested in this framework the hypothesis of faithful voters between two 
consecutive electoral moments and the engine role played by the well-known leaders. 
Thus, we test the model: 
Vot-P2008,t =  α0 + α1·Vot-P2004,t + α2·LEADER-P2008,t + 
         + α3·DUM-ET2008,t + α4·OTH2008,t + v2008,t 
where: 
Vot-P2008,t  = Votes for the party P, as shares of total votes in county t, June, 1st 
2008, local elections  
Vot-P2004,t  =  Votes for the party P, as shares of total votes in county t, June, 6
th 
2004, local elections 
LEADER-P  =  Dummy variable, which is 1 if the representative of party P wins the 
County Council on county t, and 0 otherwise; 
DUM-ET  =  Dummy variables estimating the ethnic electoral behaviour; 
OTH  =  Other political variables; 
v   =  the error variable 
t  =  county, t = 1, 2, …, 42 
We expect that α1 > 0,  (that  is  the  occurrence  of a faithful electorate), α2 > 0  (this 
means that a distinguished leader is able to draw up his party in electoral preferences), 
α3 < 0 (ethnic behaviour limits the electoral space of the political party). 
These are the obtained results: 
1. For the National Liberal Party, the equation is: 
Vot-NLP2008,t =  α0 + α1·Vot-NLP2004,t + α2·LEADER-NLP2008,t + α3·DUM-BUC2008,t+  
+ α4·DUM-SV2008,t + α5·DUM-NT2008,t + α6·DUM-CV2008,t +  
+ α7·DUM-HR2008,t + v2008,t 
The estimators are significantly different from zero and they are in concurrence with 
the expected values: the votes for the National Liberal Party are positively related to 
the faithful electorate (α1 = 0.589874), and the regional prominent leaders draw up the 
party (α2 = 9.246123). The impact of well-known leaders was also demonstrated by the 
negative dummy variables inlaid for Suceava and Neamţ – counties where the 
important leaders from 2004 of NLP migrated towards other political party. Also in 
Bucharest, NLP had not a prominent leader able to draw up the political votes for the 
Local Council.  
                                                                                                                                                           
19 See chapter 3: "The crucial question: is the instability of the VP-function apparent or inherent?" 
in the paper Lewis-Beck M.S., Paldam M., 2000, Economic voting: an introduction. Electoral 
Studies, Volume 19, Issues 2-3, June, pp. 113-121 
20 Anderson C.J., 2007, "The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of 
Democratic Accountability", Annual Reviews of Political Science, vol. 10, p.275. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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These are the obtained results: 
Coefficient  Explanatory variable 
Symbol Value 
t-statistic 
Constant  α0 8.880802  2.543851 
Vot-NLP2004  α1 0.589874  3.132387 
LEADER-NLP  α2 9.246123  4.959472 
DUM-BUC  α3 -12.22901  -7.569545 
DUM-SV  α4 -13.80540  -10.18442 
DUM-NT  α5 -8.523477  -8.450914 
DUM-CV  α6 -11.21842  -4.052888 
DUM-HR  α7 -8.084730  -2.783665 
R
2 = 0.7619, Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.0079. 
(All the estimators are significant at least 99%
21) 
 
2. For the Social Democratic Party of Romania the equation is: 
Vot-SDP2008,t =  β0 + β1·Vot-SDP2004,t + β2·LEADER-SDP2008,t + 
+ β3·DUM-CV2008,t + β4·DUM-HR2008,t + v2008,t 
These are the results: 
Coefficient  Explanatory variable 
Symbol Value 
t-statistic 
Vot-SDP2004  β1 0.776903  30.04931 
LEADER-SDP  β2 6.049016  3.829564 
DUM-CV  β3 -7.799027  -30.04931 
DUM-HR  β4 -1.663674  -7.189330 
R
2 = 0.8333, Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.0715. 
(All the estimators are significant at least 99%). 
 
The votes for the Social Democratic Party of Romania were cast essentially by the 
faithful electorate and by the engine role played by the leaders. The ethnic behaviour in 
Covasna and Harghita counties dwindle the votes for the Social Democratic Party of 
Romania. 
3. For the Democratic-Liberal Party the equation is: γ 
Vot-DLP2008,t =  γ0 + γ1·Vot-DLP2004,t + γ2·LEADER-DLP2008,t + γ3·DUM-SV2008,t + 
+ γ4·DUM-NT2008,t + γ5·DUM-CV2008,t + γ6·DUM-HR2008,t + v2008,t 
The obtained results: 
Coefficient  Explanatory variable 
Symbol Value 
t-statistic 
Constant  γ0 12.03840  3.862654 
Vot-DLP2004  γ1 0.868134  4.386154 
LEADER-DLP  γ2 9.288316  5.007201 
DUM-SV  γ3 14.00250  2.467003 
DUM-NT  γ4 14.01889  2.508325 
                                                           
21 For model analysis we used Econometric Views, and the estimation method was Least 
Squares with White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.  Regional Economic Voting in Romania 
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Coefficient  Explanatory variable 
Symbol Value 
t-statistic 
DUM-CV  γ5 -17.00624  -3.027990 
DUM-HR  γ6 -12.24872  -2.166996 
R2 = 0.7765, Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.7463. 
(All the estimators are significant at least 95%). 
 
As for the SDP, the votes for the Democratic-Liberal Party were cast by the faithful 
electorate and by the engine role played by the leaders and the ethnic behaviour 
decreased the votes for the DLP. An interesting situation was recorded in Suceava and 
Neamţ counties: the leaders’ migration from the National LP towards the DLP drifted 
the votes to DLP. 
3. Conclusions 
The voting behaviours at the Romanian regional election of June 1
st, 2008 were first 
determined by political reasons (faithful electorate), together with the influence of the 
leaders and ethnical disturbances. For all parties, the renowned leaders drew up the 
votes. The inertia in electoral behaviour (devoted voters) advantages all the parties and 
the ethnical behaviour advantages only a nationalist party. 
The electoral impact of economic variables was marginal. Perhaps the probability of re-
election of the incumbent party decreases when the economic situation deteriorates, 
but does not increase following a symmetric schema when the economic performance 
is "good". For example, through an analysis of the economic voting in Denmark, 
Nannestad and Paldam (1997) demonstrated that the reaction is about three times 
stronger to deterioration in the economy than to an improvement
22. They called this 
finding the "grievance asymmetry" (voters may react mostly to negative changes than 
to corresponding positive ones). 
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